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*The Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr., United States District 
Judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by 
designation. 
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__________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 The issue on appeal is whether the "safety valve" 
provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) applies to 21 U.S.C. § 860, the 
"schoolyard" statute, so that a court may impose a sentence 
shorter than the statutory minimum provided in § 860.    
II. 
 Between March and July 1994, John McQuilkin sold 
quantities of methamphetamine to an informant cooperating with 
the Drug Enforcement Agency and to an undercover DEA agent.  Each 
sale occurred within 1,000 feet of a school. 
 McQuilkin was arrested and charged under 21 U.S.C. 
§841(a)(1) (distribution),1 21 U.S.C. § 860 (distribution within 
                     
1
  Title 21 U.S.C. § 841 ("ordinary" distribution) provides in 
part: 
 
(a) Unlawful acts 
 Except as authorized by this subchapter, 
it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly 
or intentionally-- 
 (1) to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense . . . a controlled substance . . . . 
 
(b) Penalties 
 Except as otherwise provided in section 
849, 859, 860, or 861 of this title, any 
person who violates subsection (a) of this 
section shall be sentenced as follows: 
 . . . . 
 (1) . . . . 
 (B) In the case of a violation of 
subsection (a) of this section involving-- 
4 
1,000 feet of a school), 21 U.S.C. § 846 (conspiracy)2 and 21 
U.S.C. § 843(b) (use of a communication facility).  He pled 
guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, four counts 
of distribution of methamphetamine and four counts of 
distribution of within 1,000 feet of a school.  McQuilkin 
stipulated that he and his co-conspirator distributed more than 
100 grams but less than 400 grams of methamphetamine within 1,000 
feet of a school and this quantity was reasonably foreseeable and 
jointly undertaken by him. 
 Based on the attributable amount of methamphetamine and 
taking into account his acceptance of responsibility, McQuilkin's 
sentencing guidelines range was 57 to 71 months imprisonment. The 
district court held that McQuilkin's convictions under 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 841 and 846 met the criteria for the "safety valve" provision 
of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).  But the court ruled that 21 U.S.C. § 
860, the "schoolyard" statute, required a five year mandatory 
                                                                  
 . . . . 
  (viii) 10 grams or more of methamphetamine 
. . . or 100 grams or more of a mixture or 
substance containing a detectable amount of 
methamphetamine . . . ; 
 such person shall be sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment which may not be less than 5 
years and not more than 40 years . . . . 
2
  Title 21 U.S.C. § 846 provides: 
 
 Any person who attempts or conspires to 
commit any offense defined in this subchapter 
shall be subject to the same penalties as 
those prescribed for the offense, the 
commission of which was the object of the 
attempt or conspiracy. 
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minimum term of imprisonment, and that 18 U.S.C. §3553(f) did not 
apply to the mandatory minimum sentence under §860.   
 The district court sentenced McQuilkin to 60 months 
imprisonment to be served concurrently on all counts.  In 
imposing sentence, the court stated that it intended to sentence 
McQuilkin to the lowest sentence allowed by law.  McQuilkin has 
appealed contending the "safety valve" provision of 18 U.S.C. 
§3553(f) permits a shorter sentence than the statutory minimum of 
60 months.  We exercise plenary review.  See United States v. 
Sabarese, 71 F.3d 94, 95 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995), amended by, No. 95-
5160 (3d Cir. Jan. 22, 1996).   
III. 
A.  
 This is a matter of statutory interpretation.  Title 21 
U.S.C. § 860 (the schoolyard statute) provides in part: 
Any person who violates section 841(a)(1) . . 
. of this title by distributing . . . a 
controlled substance in or on, or within one 
thousand feet of, the real property 
comprising a . . . school . . . is (except as 
provided in subsection (b) of this section) 
subject to (1) twice the maximum punishment 
authorized by section 841(b) of this title; 
and (2) at least twice any term of supervised 
release authorized by section 841(b) of this 
title for a first offense.  A fine up to 
twice that authorized by section 841(b) of 
this title may be imposed in addition to any 
term of imprisonment authorized by this 
subsection.  Except to the extent a greater 
minimum sentence is otherwise provided by 
section 841(b) of this title, a person shall 
be sentenced under this subsection to a term 
of imprisonment of not less than one year 
 . . . . 
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 Because under the relevant facts here, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(B)(viii) mandates a five year minimum term of 
imprisonment, it supersedes the one year minimum term in § 860. 
The issue on appeal is whether 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) may relieve a 
defendant from the mandatory minimum penalty for violating 21 
U.S.C. § 860. 
 Section 3553(f) provides: 
    (f) Limitation on applicability of 
statutory minimums in certain cases.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
in the case of an offense under ... 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 841, 844, 846 ... 961, 963 the court shall 
impose a sentence pursuant to guidelines 
promulgated by the United States Sentencing 
Commission ... without regard to any 
statutory minimum sentence, if the court 
finds at sentencing [that the defendant 
satisfies certain criteria].3 
                     
3
  The criteria specified in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(f) are: 
 
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal 
history point, as determined under the sentencing 
guidelines; 
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible 
threats of violence or possess a firearm or other 
dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to 
do so) in connection with the offense; 
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious 
bodily injury to any person; 
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, 
manager, or supervisor of others in the offense, 
as determined under the sentencing guidelines and 
was not engaged in a continuing criminal 
enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848; and 
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, 
the defendant has truthfully provided to the 
Government all information and evidence the 
defendant has concerning the offense or offenses 
that were part of the same course of conduct or of 
a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the 
defendant has no relevant or useful other 
information to provide or that the Government is 
already aware of the information shall not 
7 
In the event of a violation under §§ 841, 844, 846, 961 and 963, 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) allows a sentencing court under specified 
conditions to disregard the statutory minimum and impose a 
sentence in accordance with the guidelines.4 
 By its terms, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) applies only to 
convictions under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844, 846, 961 and 963. 
Section 860 is not one of the enumerated sections.  It is a canon 
of statutory construction that the inclusion of certain 
provisions implies the exclusion of others.  The doctrine of 
inclusio unius est exclusio alterius "informs a court to exclude 
from operation those items not included in a list of elements 
that are given effect expressly by the statutory language."  In 
re TMI, 67 F.3d 1119, 1123 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Williams v. 
Wohlgemuth, 540 F.2d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 1976)), petition for cert. 
filed, (U.S. Feb. 20, 1996) (No. 95-1315).  The government 
contends the stark exclusion of § 860 from the list of sections 
embraced by § 3553(f) reflects Congress' rational decision that 
drug dealing in a protected location is sufficiently serious to 
merit substantial penalties.  In any event, nothing in the 
legislative history of § 3553(f) provides a basis for 
                                                                  
preclude a determination by the court that the 
defendant has complied with this requirement. 
 
4
  Congress adopted the "safety valve" provision in the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to mitigate the 
effects of certain mandatory minimum sentences.  See generally 
Philip Oliss, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the 
Safety Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 
1851 (1995); Fred A. Bernstein, Discretion Redux--Mandatory 
Minimums, Federal Judges, and the "Safety Valve" Provision of the 
1994 Crime Act, 20 U. Dayton L. Rev. 765 (1995).  
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interpreting the statute other than as the clear language 
provides.5  See In re TMI, 67 F.3d at 1125 ("A construction 
inconsistent with a statute's plain meaning ... is justifiable 
only when clear indications of contrary legislative intent 
exist") (quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 
F.2d 619, 633 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 556 (1993)). In 
clear and unambiguous language, therefore, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) 
does not apply to convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 860, the 
"schoolyard" statute.6 
B. 
 McQuilkin argues that 21 U.S.C. § 860 does not state a 
substantive offense but merely enhances the penalty for 
violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) committed within l,000 feet of a 
school.  McQuilkin contends the only substantive offense he 
violated was § 841(a), not § 860.  Because 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) 
applies to an "offense" under § 841, he argues the safety valve 
provision should be available to him.  Accordingly, he believes 
the court erred in imposing a mandatory minimum sentence. 
                     
5
  The "safety valve" provision adopted in the 1994 crime bill 
engendered little debate.  The only comments of plausible 
relevance were made during an exchange between Senators Biden and 
Brown on the Senate floor.  Responding to Senator Brown's 
question whether the "safety valve" applied to 21 U.S.C. § 859 
(distribution to persons under age twenty-one), Senator Biden 
said "the safety valve does not apply" to the offense of selling 
drugs to minors, and that the mandatory minimum sentence for that 
offense remained in place.  See 140 Cong. Rec. S12514 (daily ed. 
Aug 25, 1994).  There was no reference to § 860, although the 
government suggests the analogy to § 860 is manifest.  For the 
purposes of McQuilkin's argument, however, this exchange over 
§859 was at best inconclusive. 
6
  The one year minimum sentence set forth in § 860 applies when 
the quantity of drugs involved is less than required for the 
mandatory minimum sentences set forth in § 841(b). 
9 
 But 21 U.S.C. § 860 is a separate substantive offense, 
not a sentence enhancement provision.  To distinguish an 
enhancement provision from a separate offense we look to the 
intent of Congress.  See United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 
218 (3d Cir.) ("As is the case in all questions dealing with the 
scope and separate identities of criminal offenses, the answer 
hinges on the intent of Congress."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833 
(1987).  To ascertain intent we begin with the language of the 
statute.  Hawkins, 811 F.2d at 218 (citing Garrett v. United 
States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985)). 
 In this instance, the language of the statute specifies 
§ 860 is a separate offense.  Although § 860 refers to § 841, 
("any person who violates § 841(a)(1) . . . by distributing . . 
."), it requires a separate and distinct element -- distribution 
within l,000 feet of a school.  Distribution within l,000 feet of 
a school must be charged and proven beyond a reasonable doubt in 
order to obtain a conviction under § 860.  See United States v. 
Smith, 13 F.3d 380, 382-83 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding "§ 860 
constitutes an 'offense' which has as an element of proof that 
the distribution occurred within 1,000 feet of a protected 
place.").  Moreover, while § 860 incorporates the elements of 
§841(a), it does not incorporate statutory references to § 841, 
such as the one found in 21 U.S.C. § 3553(f). 
 Other courts of appeals have uniformly held § 860 is a 
separate offense that requires proof of an element that is not 
included in § 841.  See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 30 F.3d 
542, 551-53 (4th Cir.) (reversing a conviction under § 860 where 
10 
there was no evidence that the distribution occurred within 1,000 
feet of a protected place), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 605 (1994); 
United States v. Ashley, 26 F.3d 1008, 1011 (10th Cir.) 
(reaffirming an earlier decision that § 860 requires proof that 
the distribution occurred within 1,000 feet of a protected 
place), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 348 (1994); Smith, 13 F.3d at 
382-83 (holding "that the distribution occurred within 1,000 feet 
of a protected place" must be separately proved); United States 
v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C. Cir.) (holding statute 
"adds an element to the offense of section 841(a)" which must be 
"proved"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1057 (1987). 
 Moreover, nothing in the language indicates § 860 is an 
enhancement provision.  Most enhancement provisions are triggered 
by the defendant's criminal history.  In contrast, § 860 requires 
proof of certain factual predicates that are independent of the 
defendant's past crimes.  Most importantly, § 860 differs from 
enhancement provisions because it requires proof of an additional 
element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 Only one court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, has suggested § 860 is an enhancement of the offense 
defined in § 841(a).7  See United States v. Thornton, 901 F.2d 
738, 740-41 (9th Cir. 1990) (statute "provides that if the drug 
transaction made illegal by section 841 took place within 1,000 
feet of a school, the punishment for such offense will be 
enhanced.") (emphasis in original).  But in Thornton, the Ninth 
                     
7Section 860 was formerly classified as 21 U.S.C. § 845a. Pub. L. 
No. 101-647(1) amended § 845a and redesignated it as §860. 
11 
Circuit also held the predecessor to § 860 "incorporates the 
sentencing enhancement element into the underlying offense."  Id. 
(emphasis added).  Thus the court's analysis reveals some 
confusion as to whether § 860 required an additional element of 
proof or was simply an enhancement provision.  Moreover, all 
other courts of appeals that have addressed the issue have held 
§860 is not an enhancement provision.  See e.g. United States v. 
Ashley, 26 F.3d 1008, 1011 (10th Cir.) (holding § 860 is not a 
sentencing enhancer) cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 348 (1994); see 
also United States v. Horsley, 56 F.3d 50, 51 (11th Cir. 1995) (§ 
841(a) is a lesser included offense of § 860); United States v. 
Parker, 30 F.3d 542, 553 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 605 (1994); United States v. Scott, 987 F.2d 261, 266 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (same). 
 We conclude § 860 is a separate offense and not a 
sentencing enhancement of § 841(a).  Accordingly, § 3553(f) may 
not mitigate the mandatory minimum penalty under § 860. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment 
of sentence. 
 
